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PLANET OF THE REMAKES
There is a widespread critical and popular aversion to remakes of classic—and even not-so-classic—films. They will almost certainly be inferior pieces of work, and if the origi-nal is a canonized masterpiece, the remake might even taint 
its aura. Can the film lover ever see his cherished classic again without 
thinking of its horrible new Doppelgänger? A telling website reaction to 
the news that Harrison Ford and his new love Calista Flockhart were 
planning a remake of Breakfast at Tiffany’s begs:
all i can say is don’t do it! If Ford and Calista want a film to exhibit 
their undying love . . . well, don’t do it in a remake. Find a director that 
understands love on camera like Paul Thomas Anderson or Patrice Leconte 
and develop a new project with them. Be original, not Memorex. Breakfast 
at Tiffany’s is one of the few perfect films in this world or any other. 
Leave it be, please.
Such an impassioned plea is more likely to turn up on the internet 
than in the film critics’ columns of the newspapers; but here too there 
is often a deep antipathy to the very notion of a remake—not just to 
individual bad examples. The dislike of them is of course fuelled by 
plenty of uninspired or downright awful remakes, and by the recogni-
tion that Hollywood is generally more willing to reprocess ready-made 
‘content’ than to produce a film by an auteur like David Lynch, who is 
forced to seek funding in France. Even more than retreads of previous 
Hollywood movies, remakes of foreign films are a staple of contem-
porary us film production, thus transmuting cultural difference into 
the ‘natural’ idiom of the American mainstream. Recent examples are 
Vanilla Sky and The Ring. This type of copying has the advantage of an 
original that is less of an obstruction, since it is not so familiar to us audi-
ences. In either case, the studios (now a rather nostalgic name for the 
film branches of multimedia conglomerates) would rather fall back on 
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something that has proved to be successful than take anything remotely 
resembling a risk. One might also point to the phenomenon of the inter-
media remake: film versions of tv series (Mission Impossible, Charlie’s 
Angels, The Fugitive), and tv cartoons (The Flintstones, Scooby-Doo).
If it has reached a new degree of intensity in the past ten years, the tradi-
tion of remakes is as old as the culture industry itself. For the classical 
studio system this was a logical way to exploit its copyrights and its large 
staff in an industrial manner—often remaking quite recent films. In the 
mid-fifties The Philadelphia Story (1940) was turned into the Cole Porter 
musical High Society. At around the same time, Hitchcock remade his 
English The Man Who Knew Too Much (1934) in Technicolor with James 
Stewart and, sadly, Doris Day. Howard Hawks remade his own Ball of 
Fire (1941) as A Song is Born (1948), another Technicolor musical. Going 
back to the French pioneers of the film industry, the Lumière Brothers, 
one finds that even the mythical ‘first film’ was a remake. There are three 
versions of the film of workers leaving the Lumière factory in Lyons—the 
first made in the late summer of 1894, apparently as a trial run, on paper; 
a second, shot on film, in March 1895 and shown in the legendary first 
film screening in Paris on March 22nd; the third, which was for a long 
time believed to be ‘the first film’, was shot in the summer of 1895, with 
the workers wearing more festive clothes. Perhaps this was supposed to 
give a more positive image of the Lumière factory. But repetition was 
already a pillar of the culture industry before the arrival of cinema, in the 
mass literature of newspaper serials, or feuilletons.1 The same model was 
also transferred to film: screen serials thrived from the silent days to the 
1940s. Each week, one could see part of a continuing story about a hero 
such as Flash Gordon or Dick Tracy, with a cliffhanger at the end.
In recent decades, sequels and series have been the dominant modes 
of repetition in film. Aside from the remake, probably no other kind of 
film has as bad a reputation as the sequel, for which Another 48 Hours, 
Die Harder and the ironic The Naked Gun 2½ and Naked Gun 331/3 are 
telling titles. Many sequels are indeed a facile cashing-in on recent box-
office success—rather than on an older or overseas hit, as in the case 
of the remake. A sequel usually continues the story of the preceding 
film, which often means that the same tale is told again with minor 
1 Also in painting: 19th-century painters often made ‘variations’ of their own works, 
and their studios painted copies. The Goupil art firm even had its own stable of 
copyists, who churned out replicas of works by famous Salon painters.
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differences. One sequel can lead to another and they may come to be 
described as a series, although some attempts at definition propose a 
clear distinction between the two—arguing, for instance, that a film 
series presents separate stories with the same characters, while sequels 
continue a story where it left off. But do not the various Die Hard or 
Scream films amount to a series, each part presenting a more or less dis-
tinct plot, although each new film is also building on the earlier ones, 
as sequels do? On the other hand, the James Bond films clearly are not 
sequels; they form a series with many variations on a basic narrative 
scheme, without the suggestion of continuity or historical succession 
between the parts.
Time and return
In his reflections on the vicissitudes of historical time Guy Debord noted 
that modern temporality, measured in abstract units, is dominated by 
the alternation of labour and ‘free time’, thus reproducing something 
like ‘the old cyclical rhythm’ of pre-modern societies. History is perverted 
from within, thus creating the ‘pseudo-cyclical time’ of spectacle.2 In the 
writings of an author like Mircea Eliade, the ‘old cyclical time’ became 
the object of a reactionary-romantic idealization. Eliade exulted in the 
fact that traditional societies knew how to keep history—which is a series 
of catastrophes—at bay by the ritualistic repetition of mythical arche-
types. Eliade complained that today’s quasi-mythic experiences, such as 
‘killing time’ by reading or watching a film, are impoverished descend-
ants of his cherished ancient myths. Debord also regarded the time of 
spectacle as a perverted and impoverished version of the cyclical tempo-
rality of myth, but his dialectical analysis is rather less one-dimensional 
than Eliade’s nostalgic projection.3 Debord notes that a conflict was 
installed within cyclical time—the ‘childhood of time’—as rulers tried to 
impose their genealogies and aims on society. The ‘masters of time’ thus 
managed to give a sense of direction to their culture’s agricultural cycles, 
creating a new temporal mode within the world of cyclical returns that 
continued to be dominant.4 Later, more advanced masters of time would 
go further in this direction, until capitalist modernity unleashed the 
2 Guy Debord, La Société du spectacle [1967], Paris 1992, p. 151.
3 Mircea Eliade, The Myth of the Eternal Return, New York 1965, pp. 21, 34; ‘The 
Myths of the Modern World’, in Myths, Dreams and Mysteries. The Encounter Between 
Archaic Faiths and Archaic Reality, London 1968, pp. 23–38.
4 Debord, Société du spectacle, pp. 129–32.
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forces of history to the full. But it is precisely then that a reversal occurs, 
as an apparently triumphant linear history is transformed into pseudo-
cyclical returns. This is still within the framework of the historical 
direction created by the capitalist juggernaut, but these pseudo-cyclical 
returns tend to create a ‘false consciousness of time’—spectacle, or par-
celled and industrialized myth. Just as myth once established a reign 
of returns, of Wiederkehr, so now our media culture does the same, but 
in a much more planned manner. Not only the alternation of work and 
spare time but the media products, so important within the latter, are 
ruled by repetition. William Burroughs contended that the mass media 
play a similar role, in this respect, to the ceremonial Mayan calendar, a 
complicated construction with which a priestly elite ‘in effect controlled 
what the populace did, thought and felt on any given day’—creating a 
pre-ordained cyclical empire-time run by temporal masters.5
Eliade’s mythical archetypes were located in a distant, sacred era, before 
the time of man. By contrast, the semi-cyclical returns of modern series 
and sequels are ruled by models which lay claim to no origin of any 
kind. They are de-historicized myths, apparently timeless programmes. 
The characters of soap operas seem to inhabit a world that consists of 
the eternal returns of a limited number of plots, as do the protagonists 
of film series like Die Hard and James Bond. All Bond films seem to 
follow a certain archetypal plot, of which one version may be a better 
approximation than another, but not a more original one (although 
there is, of course, nostalgia for the time—in the sixties—when the 
Bond formula seemed fresh). What differentiates remakes from such 
serial repetition is the fact that the remake has a specific historical 
source: the ‘original’ film. This can be regarded as a historicization of 
the mythical, archetypal model. Because films that are remade exist 
in historical—not some primeval, mythic—time, their repetition raises 
protests from those who revere the original. Whether they offer any 
of the healing rejuvenation of time which Eliade ascribed to the older 
myths’ repetition is obviously questionable. Of course, the repetitions 
and returns of mass culture clearly entail a Lustgewinn for the viewer: 
although similarity must be alleviated by variation, enjoyment comes at 
least as much from the reproduction of what is familiar as from its mod-
ulation by what is new. But the one-sided exploitation of repetition in 
its most facile forms, to streamline production and minimize financial 
5 ‘Control’, in Daniel Odier, The Job. Interviews with William S. Burroughs, New York 
1989, p. 38.
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risks, deadens rather than recharges time—even if the consumers feel 
momentarily rejuvenated.
A thousand eyes
An exemplary case of the interweaving of remakes, sequels, serials and 
series is offered by the avatars of the Mabuse character. Dr Mabuse was 
created by Norbert Jacques as a master criminal, within the feuilleton tra-
dition of Fantômas—a mythical super-villain who time and again fools the 
law, making him the perfect ‘hero’ of his own series. After being serial-
ized in print Dr Mabuse was brought to the big screen by Fritz Lang in Dr. 
Mabuse, der Spieler (1922), a two-part ufa prestige production. Lang used 
lavish sets, leading actor Rudolf Klein-Rogge and a meandering story line 
to paint a panorama of a decadent society—Weimar Germany—so weak 
that it can easily fall prey to the evil master-mind Mabuse, a hypno tist 
who can submit people to his will. One of the most memorable scenes 
shows Mabuse’s head, facing the camera against a black background, 
growing ever closer and appearing to hypnotize the audience as well as 
his unfortunate opponent in the film. With its overt ambition to give a 
portrait of the times, and Lang’s highly stylized and sumptuous scenes, 
the first Mabuse film claimed both artistic value (as opposed to ‘unsophis-
ticated’ Hollywood entertainment) and kultur kritische ambition. Weimar 
cinema, and Lang’s in particular, could certainly put on airs; Siegfried 
Kracauer mocked the fact that at the première of Lang’s film Spione 
(1928), Thea von Harbou’s novel—a movie tie-in—was offered to the 
viewers bound in leather, as if it were a literary classic.6 But the master-
criminal Mabuse could not shake off his origins in mass culture. For all 
its production values and aspirations to social critique, Dr. Mabuse, der 
Spieler has a hopelessly hackneyed and melodramatic plot.
At the end of Der Spieler, the hunted Mabuse goes mad from fear. This 
suggests that Lang did not consider the possibility of a sequel. A decade 
later, however, he made Das Testament des Dr. Mabuse (1933), his last 
German film for years to come. Lang and von Harbou chose a remark-
able approach: rather than miraculously restoring Mabuse to health, 
or simply ignoring the end of the previous film, they show him still 
in the lunatic asylum. Whereas the parts of series such as Sherlock 
Holmes or Bond films return to a stereotyped beginning each time—
6 ‘Film 1928’, in Das Ornament der Masse, Frankfurt 1977, p. 306.
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thus putting in train a story that combines well-known elements with 
some variation—Lang’s Mabuse (again played by Klein-Rogge) has a his-
tory. In contrast to Holmes or even Bond, who merely adapt themselves 
to historical changes in order to remain the same, Mabuse does not 
exist in a cyclical universe. To be sure, he is in the grip of compulsive 
repetition: Lang shows him in his cell, frantically scribbling notes on 
paper—the ‘testament’ of the film’s title. Even in this condition, he is 
still planning evil deeds. When Mabuse-like crimes start to occur once 
more in the outside world, Kommissar Lohmann (Otto Wernicke) inves-
tigates whether he might be leading a criminal organization from his 
cell. The asylum’s director assures Lohmann that this is impossible. 
When Mabuse dies, later in the film, the crimes go on. It turns out that 
the director himself has been acting as a new Mabuse, using the plans 
scrawled by his patient. By means of a double exposure, Lang suggests 
that Mabuse’s spirit has somehow taken possession of the doctor. In 
killing his first protagonist and making the asylum director his ‘succes-
sor’, Lang suggests that ‘Mabuse’ is not so much a character as a role, 
a position in the symbolic realm that can be filled by various people. 
Nevertheless, this still entails repetition, even if not here by the ‘original’ 
Mabuse, but his stand-in. Lang’s attempts to historicize the character 
were thus frustrated by the need to use a recognizable Mabuse-pattern, 
in order to have a reason to make a Mabuse film.
Kommissar Lohmann was a familiar character from Lang’s previous 
film M (1931), with which Das Testament has much in common. The 
latter thus not only functions as a sequel to Der Spieler, but also as 
an ‘un official’ sequel to M—a double return. The virtually autonomous 
world of the mob in M, and its ruthless mock-trial of the Peter Lorre 
character, have habitually been interpreted as an allegory for the rise 
of Nazism in Germany, a view sometimes extended to the Mabuse 
sequel. But although the Mabuse character can be described as a kind 
of anarcho-fascist, the connexion with Nazism is not made explicit in 
Das Testament. It was only in his final Mabuse film, Die tausend Augen des 
Dr. Mabuse (1960), that Lang would draw an overt parallel. The film was 
the result of Lang’s collaboration with German producer Artur Brauner 
who, in the late fifties, tried to interest Lang in directing remakes of 
his Weimar films, including Die Nibelungen (1924) and a musical ver-
sion of his 1921 Der müde Tod. Instead, Lang and Brauner remade a 
film that Lang had co-scripted but had not been allowed to direct: Das 
indische Grabmal (Joe May, 1921). Almost at the end of his career, Lang 
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revisited his beginnings in the film industry, trying to rewrite his own 
history by finally shooting The Indian Tomb himself. But the resultant 
two-part film, Das indische Grabmal/Der Tiger von Eschnapur (1959) was 
a half-hearted attempt to recapture past glories. There were some appar-
ent ‘modernizations’ (sound and colour being the most prominent), but 
a film that might have been an interesting clash of the contemporary and 
the anachronistic managed only to be corny and formulaic.
Escape routes to history
Brauner then coaxed Lang into reviving Dr Mabuse. Lang signed on, 
in the knowledge that Brauner now owned the character’s copyright 
and could make a Mabuse film with or without him. But he only con-
sented to bring back the role, not the individual: ‘No, the bastard is 
dead and buried’.7 Once again, the historicity of the Mabuse universe 
was affirmed. Lang also refused to give in to Brauner’s demand to make 
the new character the biological son of Dr Mabuse; the role was not to 
be restricted to members of the same family. In the resultant film, Die 
tausend Augen des Dr. Mabuse, one of the policemen explains to his col-
leagues that Dr Mabuse had been a master criminal, active just before 
‘Hitler and the brown spectre’ came along. The real-life counter part 
of the anarcho-fascist can now, finally, be named. The new ‘Mabuse’ 
has taken over a hotel built by the ss for spying on important foreign 
visitors and equipped it with the latest cctv equipment, in order to black-
mail the guests. He wants to wreak as much havoc as possible and rise 
to power once more on the ruins of a crumbling world. ‘Mabuse’ is 
being hunted by Gert Fröbe—later to play Goldfinger in the Bond film 
of the same name—as Kommissar Kras, a fat Prussian in the style of 
Lohmann. But the ‘Mabuse’ he hunts is only a name and a mentality. 
After all, ‘the bastard is dead’, and it is another criminal genius who is 
continuing Mabuse’s work in a variety of disguises. It is as if Mabuse 
were a neurotic, driven to constant repetition: ‘[the patient] is driven to 
repeat the repressed matter as an experience in the present, instead of 
remembering it as something belonging to the past, which is what the 
physician would much rather see.’8 Psychoanalysis attempts to reintro-
duce history on an individual scale, breaking through the individual’s 
world of eternal return.
7 Patrick McGilligan, Fritz Lang: Nature of the Beast, New York 1997, p. 437.
8 Sigmund Freud, ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ (1920), in ‘Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle’ and Other Writings, London 2003, p. 56.
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In trying to historicize Mabuse, Lang functioned as the doctor’s analyst. 
But the treatment was only partially successful. Not only did Mabuse’s 
typical behaviour linger in his films like a neurotic repetition, even 
after the doctor’s death, but Mabuse himself was resurrected after Die 
tausend Augen—Lang’s last film. Critics like Jonathan Crary regard the 
Mabuse films as a Fritz Lang trilogy, but in Brauner’s eyes Lang’s final 
work was just the stepping-stone for a profitable series of low-budget 
movies.9 Companies churning out serials—Edgar Wallace thrillers, Karl 
May Westerns and Heinz Erhardt comedies—dominated the postwar 
German film industry. Brauner’s enterprise was one of them, and in 
some respects his Mabuse films are comparable to the popular Edgar 
Wallace series. Both abound with formulaic horror and suspense, and 
teem with master-criminals possessed of secret identities and ruthless 
organizations. Die tausend Augen already bore a certain resemblance to 
the Wallace films, although it is made more interesting through the sur-
veillance plot device, which is rather less silly than many of the storylines 
that would follow. In these films, Dr Mabuse has risen from the dead, 
for which no explanation is given at all. He is even played by Wolfgang 
Preiss, who played the ‘new’ Mabuse in Die tausend Augen.
Without Lang, Brauner was at last free to dispense with Mabuse’s 
historicity and make him a comic-book villain, endowed with eternal 
life. One of the post-Lang films was a 1962 remake of Das Testament des 
Dr. Mabuse, in which Mabuse dies yet again, but this time without any 
consequences for subsequent films. Historical logic is further under-
mined by the fact that Gert Fröbe, who played Kommissar Kras in Die 
tausend Augen, plays Kommissar Lohmann in the Testament remake. An 
immortal Dr Mabuse and an archetypically fat Prussian policeman with 
varying names seem to be trapped in an eternal mythic-neurotic return 
of bizarre plots—a cyclical rather than historical world. Mabuse, the 
serial villain, has been reclaimed by the repetitive culture industry from 
which he originated.
Variora of Lem
The recent attempt to integrate Stanislaw Lem’s science-fiction novel 
Solaris (1961) into this industry proved to be a rather more difficult 
undertaking, which ended in artistic as well as commercial shipwreck. 
9 Jonathan Crary, ‘Dr Mabuse and Mr Edison’, in Kerry Brougher, ed., Art and Film 
since 1945: Hall of Mirrors, Los Angeles 1996, pp. 262–75.
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Lem’s novel, itself a highly cogent meditation on historicity and repeti-
tion, revolves around the mysterious planet Solaris and the (future) 
science of Solaristics, devoted to its comprehension. Solaris is covered by 
a strange ocean, about which there has been much speculation—some 
consider it to be a living and sentient being. Solarist Kris Kelvin is sent 
to the space station Prometheus, orbiting the planet, where he finds that 
one of the Solarists residing there, Gibarian, is dead; another, Sartorius, 
hides in his laboratory and a third, Snow (Snaut in the original), is in 
a highly agitated state of mind.10 The station, it transpires, has ‘visitors’ 
who materialize at night—three-dimensional reproductions of someone 
whom the person ‘visited’ once knew and who are there when they wake 
up. Kelvin himself starts awake to find his former wife Rheya, who com-
mitted suicide ten years before, in his room.
This disturbing phenomenon appears to be caused by the enigmatic, 
intractable ocean, and began after the scientists exposed it to radiation. 
‘Perhaps the ocean reacted to the irradiation with a counter-irradiation, 
perhaps it probed our brains and penetrated to some kind of psychic 
tumour’, Snow says: ‘isolated psychic processes, enclosed, stifled, 
encysted—foci smouldering under the ashes of memory.’11 The ‘visitors’ 
appear to be distantly related to mimoids, strange plant-like structures 
which occasionally appear from the surface of the ocean, and which 
have the habit of shaping themselves into crude imitations of objects 
that are close to them. Solaris is a mimetic planet. The intention—if 
any—behind these copies remains unclear. Are the visitors sent to the 
scientists to torture them, or are they an attempt to communicate?
Solaris seems tailor-made for an ‘extremely conventional psycho analytical 
interpretation’ in terms of the Freudian uncanny.12 As in the case of 
neurosis, but in a less permanent and pathological way, a repetition-
compulsion manifests itself in the uncanny. Freud mentions that he 
once walked through an Italian town and repeatedly ended up in the 
10 Names differ in the various versions of Solaris. The Polish Snaut became Snow in 
the English translation of Lem’s novel; Hari became Khari in Russian and Rheya in 
English. Henceforth I will use the names that appear in the English version of the 
novel, from which Steven Soderbergh also worked, although in his film Kris Kelvin 
became Chris Kelvin.
11 Stanislaw Lem, Solaris (1961), London 2001, p. 77.
12 Neil Easterbrook, ‘The Sublime Simulacra: Repetition, Reversal, and Re-covery in 
Lem’s Solaris’, Critique, vol. 36, no. 3 (1995), p. 177.
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red-light district, no matter how hard he tried to avoid it.13 When such 
things occur, we fear for a moment that the world is alive, haunted by 
spirits that bear us a grudge; we relapse into a ‘primitive’, animistic atti-
tude where the self has no clear boundaries. The eminently Freudian 
phenomenon of the Doppelgänger is an after-effect of this phase, but in 
Solaris people struggle with doubles not of themselves but of people 
from their past on earth, who have somehow been reproduced by the 
ocean. Kris is thrown into a panic by the first Rheya double, and he 
sends her off into space. When the second copy (or the third Rheya in 
all) appears, he gradually comes to accept and love her as another, differ-
ent person—‘If you really were her, I might not be able to love you’. He 
deludes himself into thinking that they could go on living on the space 
station, or even travel back to earth.14 However, ‘Rheya’ herself, when she 
finds out the truth, cannot live with the fact that she is not Rheya but a 
‘visitor’. Like the original Rheya, she commits suicide, creating another 
repetition. Kelvin seems to be doomed to repeat his history with Rheya 
neurotically, rather than relegating her to memory. When he sees the 
second Rheya double as a new Rheya, he sees her not as a faithful copy 
but as a differing remake.15 But it is exactly this that traps him in neurosis 
after he has overcome the initial shock of the uncanny; it is the illusion 
of difference, of newness, that leads to an embrace of sameness. Even if 
the latter is what is truly desired, it has to be realized through a detour.
In Lem’s novel, the visitors stop returning after Sartorius exposes the 
ocean to transmissions of Kelvin’s brainwaves, so there seems to be no 
hope a fourth Rheya will appear:
I hoped for nothing. And yet I lived in expectation. Since she had gone, that 
was all that remained. I did not know what achievements, what mockery, 
even what tortures still awaited me. I knew nothing, and I persisted in the 
faith that the time of cruel miracles was not past.16 
What else could the miracle be but another Rheya? At the end of 
Tarkovsky’s 1972 film of Solaris, a time of cruel miracles seems to be in 
full swing, but this does not directly involve Rheya. Tarkovsky’s version 
contains less Solarist debate about the ocean and the problem of know-
ing an alien intelligence (if such it is), but he attunes us to the strange 
13 Sigmund Freud, ‘The Uncanny’ (1919), in The Uncanny, London 2003, p. 144.
14 Solaris, p. 153.
15 Easterbrook, ‘The Sublime Simulacra’, pp. 180–1.
16 Solaris, p. 214.
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nature of the planet by including the video testimony of Berton, a Solarist 
who explored the planet’s surface, with traumatic consequences. At the 
beginning of the film, Berton, now an old man, has come to Kelvin’s 
father’s country house to show Kelvin the tape. The space station itself 
is depicted by Tarkovsky as somewhat dilapidated, a haunted house in 
space. At the end of the film Kris has apparently returned to earth, as we 
see him once again near his father’s house, familiar from the opening 
scenes. Tarkovsky’s camera once again roves past the brook and the pond 
until he gets to the wooden house. The camera travels up into the air, 
and we see that the house stands on a little island in the Solaris ocean. 
Since we have learnt earlier on that after the radiation experiment small 
islands formed on the surface of the ocean, we are left to surmise that 
this is such an island, and the planet’s ‘cruel experiment’ has entered a 
new phase. The image, of course, is not less staggering and unexplained 
for that, but it does suggest that Kelvin has fallen back into a circular 
world of eternal returns.
Time homogenized
Although Steven Soderbergh has emphasized that his version of Solaris 
(2002) is based on Lem’s novel and not on Tarkovsky’s film, it cannot 
quite escape being seen as a remake of the latter. It benefits from the 
fact that ‘foreign’ remakes seem to have a certain critical advantage in 
the American press, where they are less frequently, and less negatively, 
compared to the originals. Soderbergh exchanges Tarkovsky’s slow pace 
for much quicker cuts and his dingy space station for shiny chrome. 
Only the rain in the scenes on earth seems to be a kind of homage to 
Tarkovsky—in the form of a facile quote of one of his signature ingre-
dients. In Soderbergh’s Solaris, the focus is on the humans; despite 
the computer-generated images, the planet and its ocean have almost 
been restricted to cameo appearances. The whole science of Solaristics 
has been scrapped. Kelvin is no longer a Solarist but a psychologist, 
dispatched to the space station because he happens to be a friend of 
Gibarian, who has sent a video message requesting his help. Soderbergh 
takes care to emphasize that the space station has been bought from 
nasa by a private company, and that its scientists (including a black 
woman, Dr Gordon, who replaces Sartorius) are looking for ways to 
exploit the planet commercially. In itself this is a witty ‘update’ of the 
story: long deliberations on the possibility of communication with an 
alien intelligence have given way to the desire to make profit. However, 
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like many of Soderbergh’s contrivances, this tends to undermine Lem’s 
carefully crafted universe. After all, who in their right mind would think 
of exploiting the bizarre, unapproachable ocean-planet of Lem’s novel? 
But then, Solaris has largely been stripped of its alien presence and 
reduced to a fancy cgi background.
One of the great achievements of Tarkovsky’s Solaris was its sense of 
place, in the dilapidated Prometheus station. With it came a sense of 
time, a sanatorium-time in which normal life and even causality seem to 
have been suspended. In this unreal temporality, Kelvin’s encounter with 
his late wife can develop its dramatic potential. Narrative connexions are 
often implicit, and sometimes the action is seemingly arrested for long 
shots—Berton’s car ride back to the city at the beginning of the film, a 
scene in the snow, a tracking shot over a Brueghel painting—that defy 
conventional cinematic logic and can function like flashbacks, showing 
images from a past life on earth. But such parentheses are devoid of 
the normal rhetoric of flashbacks: they are presented as images that are 
neither more nor less real than the others—they are simply silent. The 
problem with the incessant Hollywood-style flashbacks to Kelvin’s past 
life with Rheya in Soderbergh’s film is that they prevent the doubles of 
Rheya from becoming distinct presences. They are anecdotal and talka-
tive, creating a sense of sameness and continuity. It is impossible to 
sense that Kelvin actually falls in love with the third Rheya as a differ-
ent person, however deluded he may be. Putting more emphasis on the 
love story than either Lem or Tarkovsky, Soderbergh no doubt thought 
he was making a more touching (and more commercially viable) film, 
but he ended up making a less engaging one. The images of the past 
obscure the drama of its uncanny re-manifestation in the space station, 
and gradual transformation into an unreal present.
The end of Soderbergh’s film is an unconvincing attempt to outdo both 
Lem and Tarkovsky. Here Snow—a youngish computer nerd in this 
version—turns out to be Snow’s ‘visitor’, who has killed the real Snow. 
This sudden return to the classical form of the Doppelgänger, no doubt 
intended as a mind-bender, only muddles things. Lem and Tarkovsky 
kept the nature of the other visitors vague, but implied that the ‘foci 
smouldering under the ashes of memory’ which the ocean taps have to 
do with lovers and relatives—those in whom our deepest emotions are 
invested. In an access of narcissism, this might conceivably be Snow 
himself; but Soderbergh merely exploits the conceit for a quick thrill. 
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After this bizarre dénouement, the Snow double points out that Solaris 
is expanding and drawing the space station into it. Kelvin decides not to 
leave with Gordon in the rescue pod, but to plunge with the space station 
into Soderbergh’s Solaris. He appears to end up in some kind of New 
Age heaven, reunited with Rheya, who assures him that it doesn’t matter 
if they are dead or alive, and that all their sins have been forgiven. This 
finale is perhaps an attempt to equal Tarkovsky in finding a cinematic 
equivalent for Lem’s ‘time of cruel miracles’, but Soderbergh veers off 
into regions closer to the spectacular esotericism of M. Night Shyamalan 
(The Sixth Sense, Signs). The repeated use of the Dylan Thomas poem, 
‘And Death Shall Have No Dominion’, also suggests that Soderbergh 
was less interested in exploring his precursors’ dialectic of repetition and 
historicity, personal or cosmic, than in creating the semblance of a medi-
tation on a rosy-fingered afterlife.
Soderbergh has been commended by some for making a courageous 
move and paying for it with box-office failure—suggesting that the film 
was too good for a conservative, manipulated audience. In fact, his ver-
sion is a half-hearted attempt to make Lem’s story more palatable to a 
film culture in which Tarkovsky’s Solaris—the product of a very different 
society, in which it did not exactly fit comfortably either—could not be 
made. With its ambiguous probing into repetition and historicity, Solaris 
could be used to question the current culture of the remake. As a planet 
of remakes, Solaris is the uncanny double of Planet Hollywood. But by 
grafting clichéd flashbacks and New Age spirituality onto the material, 
Soderbergh tried to make it part of Hollywood rather than its double—to 
no avail. For contrary to the case of Dr Mabuse, there is too much in 
the earlier versions of Solaris that resists. If Soderbergh’s space oddity 
stands out in today’s commercial film culture, it does so by default.
Appropriating the remake
The ‘actually existing remake’ is in the thrall of the original, much as 
series and sequels are in the grip of formulaic plots and other industrial 
archetypes. This industry of repetition sparks off reactions that preserve 
elements from the romantic-modernist cult of originality: ‘Be original, 
not Memorex’. But much as the current practice of remakes and other 
forms of repetition seem to warrant opposition, mere rejection not only 
misses what is most problematic in them, but fails to notice the dor-
mant potential of the remake, the promise inherent in repetition. For if 
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repetition could be perverted from within, exacerbating the newness that 
disguises sameness until it changed its sign, might there not be a kind 
of remake in which repetition served difference, rather than enforcing 
mythic identity?
The Janus-face of repetition becomes especially clear in opposing inter-
pretations of Nietzsche’s vertiginous thoughts on the Eternal Return. For 
Walter Benjamin, whose notion of Jetztzeit—now-time—sought to imag-
ine a revolutionary mode of historical repetition, Nietzsche’s idea was 
clearly a case of the return of mythic cyclical time in the commodified 
dream-world of the late nineteenth century.17 By contrast, Gilles Deleuze 
saw in it a hijacking of mythical return for entirely different purposes—
Nietzsche would have accomplished nothing less than the liberation of 
a radical core from the old cyclical conception of time, by suggesting 
an eternal repetition without original, without model or archetype, in 
decentred circles not dependent on any original myth.18 The ‘same’ that 
returns is not a repetition of an ‘original’ in a ‘copy’; it is the return itself 
that is repeated, the act of repetition. This is not a process that creates 
copies of an original, but one that creates difference by generating ‘false 
pretenders’, deviant signs, bad simulacra.19 Most remakes remain bound 
to the original, which they attempt to ‘modernize’ (and, if it is a foreign 
film, to ‘Americanize’) by introducing today’s style, stars, topics and the 
like. But a different practice of the remake is possible: one that sees the 
‘original’ not as a Vorbild to be followed (if only for its rudimentary story-
line), but as something to be questioned and perverted.
This kind of remake could be a free variation or permutation, which actu-
alizes an implicit possibility. A classic Hollywood example that comes 
close to this is Hawks’s His Girl Friday (1940), one of various film ver-
sions of the play The Front Page, in which the male reporter is swapped for 
a female one. But perhaps the best example of such an approach would 
not be a remake, strictly speaking, but a kind of hostile takeover of a film 
series. In Alphaville Godard adapted the hero of a cheap b-movie series 
(Lemmy Caution) and the actor who portrayed him (Eddie Constantine) 
for his own ends. But this kind of free remake is not the only option. 
Slavoj Žižek has noted that one could just as well fashion a literal remake 
17 Walter Benjamin, Das Passagen-Werk, in Gesammelte Schriften, vol. i, Frankfurt 
1991, pp. 177–8.
18 Gilles Deleuze, Différence et répétition, Paris 1968, pp. 92, 123–5, 383–4.
19 Gilles Deleuze, Logique du sens, Paris 1969, pp. 295–6.
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that would follow the first film in an extremely faithful, detailed way, 
allowing the unavoidable differences to serve as symptoms underlining 
the fact that the exact moment and its meaning cannot be recreated.20 At 
the time when Brauner proposed various remakes to him, Lang appar-
ently contemplated such a literal remake of Murnau’s Faust (1926). Gus 
Van Sant came close to this with his version of Psycho (1998). In a delib-
erate departure from the dominant practice, he largely refrained from 
trying to make the film more ‘of its time’ by closely following the origi-
nal script and mise-en-scène. In doing so, Van Sant courted critical and 
commercial disaster, where Soderbergh merely blundered into it. The 
result is a strange film which lacks the compelling actors and directorial 
grace-notes of Hitchcock’s original, but does afford a somewhat uncanny 
experience. For precisely by following Hitchcock’s film in a way that 
could be seen as a ritual repetition of a historical model, he poses the 
question of its specificity—that is, its peculiar combin ation of relevance 
and obsolescence. Regrettably, however, Van Sant could not resist making 
some changes that compromised the conceptual clarity of his exercise.
Historicization from within
The exact, literalist remake can be taken to an extreme by appropriation. 
After all, a literal reproduction through selection and presentation still 
alters the original. Douglas Gordon’s 24 Hour Psycho (1993), in which a 
projection of Hitchcock’s film is protracted over 24 hours (thus appear-
ing as a series of stills), was in this sense a very interesting remake of 
Psycho. If apparent newness can disguise repetition, a literal repetition 
can produce difference. In either case, the point of such a remake is not 
to extract a film from its time and adapt it, but to look at our culture 
from the standpoint of that film—through a version of it. In the media-
mythic culture of repetition, the first film becomes an original whose 
repetition is seen as dependent upon and hence inferior to it. But the 
remake should be a transformation from within, an auto-deconstruction 
and reconstruction; not something done to a film, but done from and 
with a film. The result could yield a messianic now-time, anachronistic 
non-identity or any number of bewildering admixtures of the two.
A particularly intriguing recent remake, and one that defies easy classi-
fication, is Stan Douglas’s Journey into Fear (2001). This film installation 
combines elements from Orson Welles’s Journey into Fear of 1942 
20 Slavoj Žižek, Enjoy Your Symptom!, New York 2001, pp. 206–7.
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(Welles was replaced as director by Norman Foster half-way through film-
ing) and its 1975 remake by Daniel Mann, with excerpts from Herman 
Melville’s The Confidence-Man. Douglas notes that Mann’s remake is 
‘uncharacteristically, an improvement over the original.’21 In the admit-
tedly rather mediocre movie of 1942—itself based on a novel by Eric 
Ambler—Joseph Cotten plays Graham, an American arms dealer in the 
Second World War, who tries to leave Turkey by boat. Among the passen-
gers is a German spy called Möller who wants to kill him. In the remake, 
the 1940s setting has given way to the oil crisis of the early 1970s. 
Graham has been transformed into a surveyor of petroleum deposits in 
Turkey, while Möller works for an organization that would gain a large 
profit if the information Graham is carrying were to arrive in the United 
States six weeks later. Douglas regards the transition from government 
operative to agent of corporations as indicative of ‘the passage from a 
world in which power is brokered by politics to one in which finance is 
the preferred medium of influence.’22
Douglas’s own 2001 remake, or meta-remake, is a film installation in 
which a looped piece of film of about 15 minutes is accompanied by 
a soundtrack with 625 permutations, which takes 157 hours to play 
in its entirety. The film shows a series of exchanges between Graham 
(who is here a woman) and Möller, who tries to convince Graham to 
delay the boat’s entry into the harbour, which again seems to entail 
financial benefits for someone. The dialogue contains lines taken from 
Melville’s novel, in which various avatars of what appears to be the same 
mythical fraudster trick travellers on the Mississippi steamboat Fidèle. 
With their oddly permutated dialogues on a freight ship, also called 
Fidèle, Douglas’s Graham and Möller seem to be trapped in a world in 
which business means an endless, circular con-game:
Proponents of the so-called New Economy propose that we live in a per-
petual present and care as much about the future as they do about the 
past. Journey into Fear is an endless, cyclical voyage but, as one gradually 
becomes aware of its structure, one can at least intuit how the future 
became history.23
With Douglas, the remake becomes a form of speculative history rather 
than reprocessed content.
21 Stan Douglas, Journey into Fear, Köln 2002, p. 135.
22 Douglas, Journey into Fear, p. 136. 23 Douglas, Journey into Fear, p. 137.
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Contemporary artists like Douglas are in the process of appropriating 
the remake from the film industry. Perhaps the peculiar economy of 
the art world makes it a more suitable sphere for the realization of 
remakes that resist the dominant culture of repetition. But wherever 
it originates, the hope held out by the remake lies in the liberation of 
the dormant possibilities of mass culture—its utopian potential. The 
vicious circle of standardized remake production—its frozen move-
ment of mythical signs—needs to be derailed. It is intrinsic to these 
signs that such a practice is possible. The myths of the media them-
selves harbour a potential to generate second-degree myths that offer 
glimpses of what Barthes called a ‘true mythology’, in which myth is 
fleetingly transformed by reason and history.24 This would necessarily 
involve a more complex interplay of mythos and logos than the rational-
ized irrationality of the culture industry permits. Such glimmerings can 
appear only at irregular intervals. It is not just corporate legal actions 
against ‘copyright infringement’, serious as these are, that stand in the 
way. This kind of remake cannot be mass-produced with industrialized, 
pseudo-cyclical regularity.
24 Roland Barthes, Mythologies, Paris 1957, p. 222
